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A i W l B S N G S A F E ~  CULTURG KllZlNA EUGHT TRAIlVlWG ORG4hTZATION 
David Freiwald, Carolina LeiwAndemm, and Erik Baker 
Abstract 
This study was prampted by multiple aimaft hull losses experienced by a muhinational, multi-campus flight 
training -. A mixed methods study was condudd to assess the adtihdes aad pemepti0118 of the opemtbm 
and mauagement staff at &is flight training o q p i d o n  though the use of a survey imtnment previously exist& 
d ~ i n o r d e r t o e n s u r e v a l i d i t y , a n d ~ e w s w i t h k e y s t a f f m e m b e r s . ~ ~ d y s i s w a s  
perfbmed to identify underlying constructs in the penxptions and rrttitudes of the staff in order to iden* beliefk that 
maysigpifjrafiighttraining - " thatisatrisk.Ananalysiswascombtedusingtfiese~alongwith 
t h e ~ o ~ e d ~ k e y i n M ~ t o ~ u n d e r s t a n d t h e b e l i ~ ~ a n d ~ o n s W q  
place similar flight training mganhtiuns at risk. The research study identifies a lack of a safkdy culture throughout 
the e o n .  The current system is substautially reliant an the necessity of flight instructors and their students 
to maintain a clean mxd in order to be viable kr futm employment aad is seen by this operetor as the primary 
system for ensuring accountable action by agents within the system. The implememtation of a Safbty Management 
S m  is mxm.unended as a result of this study. 
. . 
In2011,thetwoUnaedSlatescempusesofa 
m u h a t m d f l i g h t t m i n i n g ~ o n ~ a h i g h  
number of operalid aircraft accidents and incidents, 
including fourfaEalitiesmtwo separate acciden!~ andanet 
loss of iiwz akhms. In a l5rmomdh peaiod between April 
of 2010 aud July of 201 1,25,696 hours wem flown while 
thecmpmysMtwoWaccidents,atotaloffivelrull 




persod November 4,2011). All of the 
accidentsmvolvedstudenbmsolo~or~.Duriug 
thesameperiod,theUnaedKingdomcampusesofthesame 
~ o n d i d m t b e v e a n y ~ a r ~ A t  
p r e s e n t ~ W P - =  
. . 
does employ a 
Management s- (WS) or any * W-m 
beyond a nominal quality assurance program. 
Evenmthedynamicewhmentofhigh-tempo 
~trainingtfrisrateofoceurrenceiswtable.Mare 
~ , ~ r a t e o f ~ i s b o t l l e c c p w m i c a l l y a n d  
sociaUy mmtabble and requires htenmtion (Strcruch, 
2004).BecaYsetheseeventsappeartooccurinserial 
isolation to each other, there is no systemic analysis as to the 
rwtcausemcauseslhatmaymderlktheewnls.Inafli@ 
-wP--s . . the hstmbm are m p d b l e  fbr 
produdion and also tasked with inculceting v&e, 
particularly safety values, into their studenb. It is a peculiar 
aspectofaviadion~mtbeUnitedSEatesthattbe 
r n a j o r i t y o f i n s t n r c t o r s m n o t ~ ~ b u t m  
often a year or less removed h m  the experhm level of 
theirnewshdents(~OwnersandPilotsAssociation, 
2010). Many o h  see inslmdonal careers as a stepping- 
stone to an airline cockpi4 and economic fmces fidm 
~ t h i s w i t h a n i n ~ r e l a t i ~ b e t w e e n ~  
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phenamenon is well doammhi m the literature. What 
malres ther i seminc~so troub l ing i s tha t i t i s~  
&niagaperiodofecanaaicandiadustrys$gpatimThae 




indicative of systemic shortadqp whm taken 




related to st&@ are often h m d  m the medical arena, and a 
number of these studies drrrw parallels to lessons learned m 
r r v i a t i o a , o f t e n ~ o u t h o w ~ ~ ~  
gredyevolvedmtheaviat ion~.Johmsoaand 
Terrence(2008)examinedthe~cul tureofau 
aviation oqpmbm . . and how that culture and individual 
m u - s t & @ d e c l s l a M n e l o n g  . . ma 
less-then-ophal, high-workload avironmat. A 
~ v e m e t h o d o l o g y ~ c o n t e n t a u a l y s h a n d t w o  
~ v e ~ f o c u a e d a n d i n d i ~ ~ e w s ,  
aswellasobsendmwasempbyedmIfiissbPdy.The 
compyutilizedfmthestudywasAcmeCommdtyAir 
Mce (ACAS), Inc., which provides F .. . 
ass i s tance inover35~colmtr ies .ACAS's~ons  
aremostoftmcambtedmfareipnationswherc~~~~and 
MP=O=lfVand maiataintheaircd,whiIelivingand 
warking m en- harsh conditions. To 
axxxmtplish its mission, ACAS owns, aperates, aud 
. . 
m a m t m s a n u m b e s o f E m r a l l e r s h g l e a n d ~  
~ p e r m a t i q g a c c e s s t o l r r n o t e a r e a s l e s s ~ v e t o  
~ l a r g e r t u r b o j e t a i r c r a f t A C A S h a s l o n g ~  
theneed&uastrongaviath~pgram, and in 1977 
beg8Qassig&gtraiuedsafetypgsopmeldthe~ 
level. 
The qumthtive portion of the Johnson and 
TerrencestudycKmaamdonsmahFinpthesafbtyrepolts 
~ ~ b y p i l o g a n d ~ ~  
T h e s t u d y ~ ~ t h a t ~ ~ a n d ~  
~ r e g u l t e d i n c a n d u c t i n g f l i g h t ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ m l e s s r  
than-opthd conditians. Ractices, such as requiring its 
f l i g h t s s a f f t o ~ a d r l i l i o n s l  - ' -' l&ies,alao 
c m t r h h l  m varying degrees to individual stress and 
faSigue.BothstressandMguewereimplicatedmpoarm- 
f l i g h t d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g , ~ a n d ~ . P i l o t e r r o r  
was most often the umclusim of ACAS aircraff accident 
ignarins the effect of corpotate expectati01.w 
plecedanf l ightgews .ACASexpecmionsdto  
prkithepductionover~.WhenACASflightcrews 
were kxd with decisions munding these m o l l s ,  
ACAS could have anticipated most of its crewmembers 
wuuld have made choices that placed mission ahead of 
=few. 
Biarman, Paletz, Oresarm, and Brooks (2009) 
examinedthedirectandindirectpressuresthatcanbe 
exmedanpilotsbyAlaslcrmaperatars.Inadditioa,the 
paper examimd ways in which ~ o n s  and 
individuals manage the e&As of pressure. The study built 
on pmious research that utilized a wwey imlmmnt that 
revealedcompanieswithanel~accidentratearemore 
l ike lytostresson~Cliveryofmai las~tothcir  
lkancial success, and to be less amcaned about the effect 
of scheduling practices on the fatigue levels oftheir pilots. 
~ p i l a t s w h o a e W m A l a s k a w e r e r e c t u i b e d , v i a  
~ a n d w e r e b n h d i n A n & o m g e a n d  
F * ~ t r a i n e d i n t h e c r i t i c a l d e c i s i c m  
method,andwithbackgro~11dsinalf iat ion,~ 
interviews to explam weuther-related incidents that had 
b l h g e d  the participant$ skills as a pilot Based on 
tmwdpb of the taped interviews, a set of bottom-up 
~ e s w e s c r e a t e d b y i d e n t i f y i n g t y p e s ~ f ~ .  
'Ibis initial schem was gemen&d m a data-driven Wan 
The cWiled catego& were then chwtemd iuto themes 
bamioncanceptualmty.  
The Biannan et al. study concluded that pilots in 
Alaska~bothimpl ic i tandexpl ic i tmamsaud 
expecWicmsto5ymrmaginaldons.Pressurealso 
amx iiwn pilots' awareness of the need fm their 'kampany 
to make money and perceived job mqet i t ion Some 
Alaskau apembrs were able to miligab the e ik ts  of 
~ o n ~ ~ ; s a m e p i l a t s r e p o r t e d ~  
pressure to fly by mmaghg their employer's 
and .' " gsakty. 
'nle-*wmlmsd 
intowhtitismrwlrnowniudmtry-wideasan-. 
A c a d b g  to Brown (2008), the shcatmmQp of the 
lradi t ionalpro~arethe ircumbersome~onthe  
. .. 
r a d m b d o f ~ i n s t e a d o f a h o l i s t i c , b i g -  
p i c h a ~ v e . T r a d i t i o n a l ~ h a v a ~ o n  
%port@ and events that have already 
ocamd" (Brown, 2008). The new SMS appraach involves 
ansnt i re f l i g t l tOpera t ian (p i la&~~suppoPt  
p e w o a a e l ) w o d d n g ~ t o h r e a s e a v i a t i u n ~  
using a comprehensive systems perspe&ve (Brown, 2008). 
Brownckscrii*as*iiwnhrrrm,orthe 
JAAER, Winta 2013 
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. .  . 
mummation and nmqment of operational risk. Since 
there wil l  ahvay~ be hazards and risks involved with 
a v i a t i ~ p r o a c t i v e * ~ ( a n S M S ) i s r e q u i f f d  
toidenti@andcontrolthoaehazds,~gthoserisks 
to efktively manage aviation mi%ly. 
I n h i s 2 0 0 1 ~ D u t c h e r l o o k e d a t t h e ~ s  
t o w a r d s f l i g h t ~ u s i n g t h e R a y e l ~ A i r C a d e t  
Gliding Program (RCACGP) as his subject base. He 
coll~69retumedwweysmeascnriaga#itndcs~ 
~ a n d ~ ~ t r a i n i n g M ~ a n d  
c a d e t s a l i k e . H i s r e s u l t s ~ n o s t a b i s S i c a l ~ o n  
thosedtudesbetweeninstructorsandcadets,menand 
women, a low and high flight time. Not mpid@y, 
Dutcher's(2001)datashowedthatthepreviousinvolvement 
in an aviation incideat leads to a mom positive Attitnrle 
tiowardssafietytrainingHedrewthecmclushthatneither 
hquencyofexposuretohumaufactarstrainingnarthe 
acmmuhion of flight hours stetistically changed 
pmticipmb' attihdes about this training ibr the bGtter 
(Dubher, 2001). IMcher did find hat the poswsh of 
mureadvencedpilotlicensesdidimprovetheparticipaub' 
p e m p t i o n o f t h e r e ~ o f t h e ~ t r a i n i n g .  
Dutch, Camkk, aud~(2003)mskesaaew 
redhtion,"megsrPiagpasaanelattihvlenmaybeabettn 
measureoftrueflightsafetythanoccurrencerates.n His 
lhth research on this same subject data led him to 




~~~n@Il tchere ta l . , 2003 ,p .4 ) .Accord iqgto  
mcheretal.,"aq . .. mustpvidean- 
cunducive to the development and maintenance of aviation 
saf;;ety" (2003, P. 4)- T b '  "mcldents . . should be of 
mare canam, viewed as ideal hmhg oppoahrmhes - -  n 
(2003, p. 4). Dutcher et A's methods involved a 
~ ~ c o n t s i n i n g 3 0 ~ 4 e ~ 0 ~ l s o n f l i g h t  
~ ~ t h e a p e n ~ ~ o a s ~ ~  . . 
andgeneralpem@onsofsdk&audademo@&ic 
sectioaHealsoseaStwo~surveystoaboutten 
~ o f t h e ~ ~ ~ w e ! r e i n s t r u c t e d t o r e t u r n  
~atleastanew#kapart .~usedthistoestablish 
reliabilitykhistest. 
D i l h m , V o g e s , a n d R o b e r & m ~ ~ a n  
18qwstion Likert survey to detcmh the pemptim of 
a v i a t i o a s t u d e n t s t o w a r d s ~ ~ l m d t h e  
~ r e e s o a s k ~ t o f i l e m i % l y o c c w e n c e r e p a a $  
at Purdue University and Southern IUinois University 
Carbondale. Dillman et at (2007, p. 1) thought that the "key 
ingdienttothesuccessofauysafetycultureis theneed for 
~aboutunsafiEevents,activitiies,orpotentialEy 
h a z a P d a u s ~ o J l o c c a s i ~ ~  . . m or 
w i t m s s c s t o ~ o r ~ l m ! 3 a f e ~ ~  
townnn~catethe~onthatisvi tal tomaintaining 
the amthdty of the safiety culturen @illman et al., 2007, p. 
l).ThGyfibrmdthattheprimaryregsonsfornotsubmating 
saktyoccurrencereports~"alacLoftime,ridiculeM 
others, and fiwm peens'' @illman et al., 
2007, p. 1). Dilhnan notices possible reasuns for faihae to 
~ f e a r o f p r m i a h m m S , l a c k o f ~ ~  
l a c l r o f ~ l a c k o f a s a f e t y p r i o r i t y , o r a ~  
pemptionofwhatiscansideredsafear~.Themey 
included Likert-type data as well as open-ended essay 
mspams,buthe~adeairetogobackamdobSsin 
q u a w i w 3 d a t a ~ ~ d s t u d e a t s a n d  
~ t o f U r t h e r a n a l y z e h i s r e s e a r c h q u e s t i 0 1 1 .  
Unihmakly, the Likertdata resulted m bell curve data 
W i t h n o t h i a g ~ c a U y s i g n i l i c a n t O r ~ T h e  
~ n o t e d ~ t h e m o s t ~ r e s p o a s e s w e r e f i a m  
the open-ended questicms which expmsly detailed specific 
pblemsthattheLikertquestionscoutdnot: need forbetter 
access to^^ alackoftimetoiillthemout, and 
-%"he psychology that impacts a penwm's desire to learn 
quietly Mtheir ownmidakes ismk&dable" @illman 
etal.,2007,p. lO).Unfiortmrabely,theseprivatemamentsof 
s e I f ~ m d ~ 0 1 1 d o n o t n e c e s s a r i l y ~  
to the growth of a flight school m an oqymhlional sense. 
Research Q I I ~ M  
T h t h e r e s e d l ~ 0 m s t h a t t h i s s t u d y  
hedg&dwere: 
1. In a flight training w o n  with 
operational deficiencies that have mmbd m 
d a c d e m , w h a t i s t h e  " of 
~ c i x l s m a d * ~  
2. How do key idv idds  within the 
arganization describe the underlying 
elemenls? 
3. Bascdlmtheresnlts,wbatconldbe~ 
in regsrds to imphmtath of a SafiEty 
w m - 7  
Method 
A mixed methods research design was selected fbr 
this study that i n c M  qwnhtive and qditative data 
collecth and adysis. The research design was an 
exphataay -design ( m u  & plan0 
Clark, 2010). In this mixed methods design, the quabtive 
JAAER, W m l s  #)13 
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dataisiutdedtoenhancetheundersEandingofthe 
quautitative data This type of design was selectedto assess 
t r e n d s a n d r e ~ w i t h ~ d a t a a n d a l s o  




multiple events leading to iuckhb and accidents. An 
exphatory~mixedmethodsdesignwasdized, 
and it involved colkting qua&ative data M and then 
exputhe- 
. . 
mulls wilb in-deglh qaalitstive 
d a t a I n t h e q u a n t M v e p h a s e o f t h e s t u d y , ~  
completed a survey. Explauatq Eactar adysh and 
multiple regression was utilized to analyze and fiud the 
~ t f r a t c o p l l d b e ~ t o n m d e n r t a n d t h e s a f e t y  
culture of the - . .. Thequalitstive*was 
~byinterviewiagpartici~tbrrtammembersof 
t h e ~ 0 ~ 1 T h e r e s u l t s o f t h e ~ v e p a I t o f t h e  
s h d y w e r e u t i b d t o e x p l a i n d ~ t h e ~ o f t h e  
qumtwves$dy. 
Participant8 and Somphg ~ P I W  
Theshdypadi&mbwemdrawnfiwnthem 
e~np~oftheUllitedstateSdtheUnitedKingdoln 
training locations ofthe ' " being studied. The 
~ ~ 0 f t h e s u r v e y ~ ~ w a s ~ W  
using con* BBrnpring of vohmteer employees 
cumdy employed and abk to receive email at their 
~ a d d r e s s . T h e ~ ~ a l s o ~ l y  
recruited in an attempt to obtait~ a minimum of ten m each 
- 
a n d - - d T h e s e h  .. Are& 
~ ~ ~ g m u l w f o r s u b s e q u e n t a n a l y s e s  





Thequd ta t i ve~of thes tudyu t i l i z ed the  








admmge of allowing a larger amouut of the Earget 
~ 0 1 1 t o b e ~ d t o d o s o ~ a n d  
wrthouthrofnegativerepemdom,particularlygiventhe 
questionsabolltthenatureofthe~on. 
The CASS was designed to measure five 
i n d i m  of d k t y  culture, previously 
~ b y W i e g m w n , v a n T b a d e n , M i t c h e l I , ~ a n d  
Zhang (2003) fiwn reviews of lhe l b a t m .  Theae 
indicatars~theirworkweresynthesized~umnnon 
themes in safiety culture mearch across multiple fields, 
inclusiveofavhth,andarelistedbelaw. 
oqpbtional Co " lt to Safety: The degree 
to which upper =wFm=t m s  safety,
as evidenced by sa.&ty-related policies and the 
t of resolaces to maintain and 
impmvedopemths. 
Managerial Involvement in !3akty: The degree to 
which middle and lower-level manaps am 
personallyiwolvedin~acthdiesandm 
Pro-b*enrang-emp1w=. 
Employee The degree to which 
employees am invited to participate in safiety- 
related activities and decisims, end 
e n c o u r e g e d t o t s k e p e r s o n a l ~ f i m  
safety. 
Accaurrtability System: The degree to which the 
. . 
rewards sai% behavior and 
d i s p e a s e s c a n s e q u e n c e s ~ u n a a f e ~ .  
Reposing Systex~ The degree to which the 
-on possesses an e M v e ,  accessible 
m e a r m o f r e p a r h g s a f e t y ~ t h o s e  
empl~amwillingtouse. 
As with Wiegmam et d's  original work (2002), 
the safiEty culture survey is oomprised of eighty-four items 
t h a t a r e g r o u p e d a s b ~ m e a s u r e s o f ~  . . 
systems (n = lo), measums of managed mvolvement (n = 
17), measures of orgdzdonal mt (n = 301 
m e a s u r e s o f p i l o t ~ ( n =  14),andmeasurement 
o f e v i d e a c e o f ~ v e ~ s y s t e m s ( n = 1 3 ) ,  
o c c l n r i n g i n ~ ~ t f w u g h o u t t h e i a s h u m e n t .  
Participants respanded using a fimpoint LM-type scale 
ranninn hm 1 (-0wV disagree), 3 (neither agree nor 
~ ) , ~ 5 ( s h . o a g l Y 4 F = X * * - t h f f e  
scares are labeled. A seven-point scale was pre-tested but 
rejected due to negative participant response given the 
relatively high mrmbeP of itiems in the instnrment. In 
additimtotbequdtatived2lta~partiCipantsare 
asked to indicate their poaitian, tenure with the company, 
t e r n  m their present posith, and age. The instrument is 
atta&ed m Appendix A. The hthdional Review Board of 
Embry-Riddle Aemmdd  University reviewed the 
~ a n d d e t e n m i n e d t h e r e s e a r c h t o b e e x e a n p t ~  
45 CFR 46.101(bX2)0. 
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A n i n t e r v i e w c a s e a M l y s i s w a s ~ t o  
e x p l o r e t h e ~ c a n m m n t h e m e s ~ t h e w n r v q r  
hkment. 'Lhe hrviews were reeded using a digital 
recaderandtranscribedusingsoftwarewithmanual 
d c a t i o n  The transcripts werethenhmtidy enah/zed 
are AttAChCdmAppedixB. 
Data CoIIeCtion 
Survey data were collected eleckdcaUy over a 
~ ~ N ~ w a s g i v e n o a e w e e k m  
advcmcebyrmailandagainwhmthesunnybecam 
available. Supenrisary and persarmel were 
asked to remind employees and enmuage them to 
participate.Interviewdatawascollectedmpersanendover 




T h e a u l h m c o n d u c 6 e d ~ *  
(CFA) using the SPSS and AMOS software 
~ t o ~ t h e s t M c t u r e o f t h e s u r v c y i t e m s . A n 0 d  
C F A f m t h e f i v e - ~ m o d e l w a s ~ e a d t h m  
s i n g l e - ~ m a d e l s f m e e c h o f t h e f i v e ~ ~  
weretestedindividuaUy,~llowiugthesamefechniqueasm 
the ariginal design (Wiegmarm et al., Models are usually 
c o a s i d e r e d t o f i t w l e l l * t h e c h i ~ v a l u e i s  
I M m 3 i @ i a m t c o m p e r e d t o t h e ~ o f ~ t h e  
RMSEA is below .10; andtheNFI, TLI, andRNI are above 
.90 (McDonald & Ho, 2002). In prepmth fiw the CFA, 
t h e r a w c a m l a t i o n s ~ ~ ~ e x a m i n e d . ' L b e  
resultsof~CFA,aswellasewmninatiaa,wcre~ 
with those of the ariginal authar. 
Following didation of the instrument through 
CFA, multiple m p s s h  adysis was pdbmed with 
s tepwiseentryanthe i tem!3dthe~agains t the  
demogeapbic Mxmtion Errors inthe model as well as 
influential cases were studied as a guide to ndkmmt and 
imp? .. of the q d h t h  hhume& 
~ t i h t i v t p b r a c  
Jwcriptive st8twc.s 
There were 63 retumed quadtdve surveys 
collectedan83~Likertscaleitems.The 






survey distribution to mare than just one flight school 
coarparmy. Over lm-tlhh (68.3%) of the returns were 
h m  the two Florida based flight schools while the other 
20 were split fairly evenly h m  the remaining four British 
flight schools. Filly-* of the respondents were males 
(84%), end 46 ofthe total were imlmbr pilots (73%); 
t h e o t h e a 1 7 w e r e e i t h e r ~ 0 , ~ ( 6 ) , a r  
mahbmm persomael (4). Fortmately, there were no 
missingdataintheentiretyofthe63retumedsurveys. 
Chmba&'sAlpba&owedstroag~cmsofre~ 
fmorgr . .. (3 " (.79), 
Involvement (.74), and Reparting !3ystem (.67), but was 
weak m Accountabii !3ystem (58) and Pilot 
Iw)o=m- (-53)- 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistia by Faciliv 
Reqwmy Perceart Valid Peacent CunrmlabivsPercent 
- W S  1 (U-s.1 29 46.0 46.0 46.0 
Campus 2 (U-S-1 14 22.2 22.2 68.3 
Campus 3 (UJQ 7 11.1 11.1 79.4 
-WS4(U-Q 4 6 3  6 3  85.7 
Campus 5 (UK) 6 9.5 9.5 95.2 
Campus 6 (U.m 3 4.8 4.8 100.0 
Total 63 100.0 100.0 
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Table 2 
Desdutive Statistia bv Gen&r 
Fresuency Percent Valid Percent CumuWw Percent 
Male 53 84.1 84.1 84.1 
Female 10 15.9 15.9 100.0 
Total 63 100.0 100.0 
Table 3 
Des~~ipiiwstaiisti~~ byEmpl4ymodPa~ilion 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent CMlulative Percent 
Instructor 46 73.0 73 .O 73.0 
Manager 7 11.1 11.1 84.1 
4 6.3 6.3 90.5 
s m  6 9.5 9.5 100.0 
Total 63 100.0 100.0 
FactorAarrlyshRamlls 
P h c i p l  ampommb analysis with varhnaoc rotation was 
conductedtoassessthe~structureforthe83items 
ofthesurvey' - t . T i ~ e a s ~ m o f ~  
sampl ingwasmetZhe~ufrmamel i ty , l inear  
relasi- between pairs ofvariables, and the variables 
beiicurrelatdatamodemtelevelwere~dsome 
variables did not meet the assumptions. The determinant 
waszero,soafactmanelyticsolutioncannotbeobtabd. 
ThlE5theresultsshouldbeviewedwith~Five~ 
w e r e ~ ~ t o t h e f i v e s c a l e s i n t h e  
reporhgsys&an. ' Ibeitans~witheachscate8re 
detailed in Appendix C. A h  rotation, the fht factor, 
Aammtability, ammted for 11.3% of the varience, the 
JecondWar,ManagaialImrolven&,~h6.0%, 
thethird*,organiddCr " t,aaxmtedk 
5 . 6 ° ~ t h e f o u r t h ~ , P i l o t ~  acmmtedfor 
5.4%,dthefifth~,ReportingSystem,accomtedfw 
5 . 3 ~ t h e d i n e d v a r i a n c e h t h e ~ ~ w a s 3 8 . 1 % .  
F a c t o r ~ ~ t h e m t a t e d ~ e r e s h o w n i n T a b l e 4 .  
-46 JAAER, Wiutcr 2013 
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Fadm Loadiqpjhr the Rotatad Factors 
Item Factor Cr 1ity 
1 2 3 4 5 
56 .70 .62 
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MANOVA Results 
A d v a r i a t e  analysis of variance was u d w t e d  to 
e v a h l m ~ ~ f a c i l i t y ~ g e m d e r , a n d  
e m p h y e e ~ m a n a l i n e a r c o m b ~ o f 8 3  itransfbm 
thesurvey' - t and whether there was an iutemtion 
between facility, gender, and employee position. The 
~ a M o f i n d e p e n d a a c e o f o b e e r v e t i m s a n d  
h a m o g e n e i t y o f ~ ~ w e r e c h e c k e d a n d m e t  
The interadon of gender and position was significant, 
Willrs' A = .002, F (403) = 3 1.95,~ =.03 1, multivariate q2 
= 99. 'Ibis indicetesthesh linearcaqmite ofall 83 
s u n n y i t e a a s m o n t h e ~ ~ o f g e n d e r a n d  
employee psition. The braction of facility and gender 
was Qydhut, Wihs' A = .OW, F (80,4) = 5.98,~ = .046, 
*. . 
eq2=.99.m~fhefihelinear 
compite of all 83 survey items diffas on the combhtb 
of gender and facility loadion The interadon of facility 
a n d p o s i l h w a s n o t s i g d i c a n t , W ~ ' A = . 0 0 0 , F  
(320,33.5)=1.32,~=.164, "' 'te$=.92.Themain 
etFEct fm facility was girmiticrmt Wilks' A = .000, F 
(200J5.3) = 2.16, p = .042, multivariate q2 = .97. This 
indicates that the linear ccnupo& of all 83 survey items 
di f f i eRf ix f l i ght schoo lMan.Themain~fm~ 
was not sienifiFJmt WiW A = .008, F (402) = 6.09, p = 
. 1 5 1 , d ~ q 2 = . 9 9 . T h e m a i n ~ f o r ~ o n w a s  
not -cant, Wilks' A = .000, F (120,6.9) = 1.97, p = 
. . 
.176, mubmate q2 = .97. 
QMnnt8tiveIuferenceB 
A signiticant &&tical diEemce occurred in 
regards to flight school locetion on the 83 item safety 
s u r v e y . T h e s i r m i f i a m t ~ o f g m d e r a u d e m p ~  
p o s i t i o n ~ l y o c c y r s b e a u w o f s o m e ~ m t h e  
~ c d i s t c i i T h e t e n f m c a e s m t b e s u r v e y  
werecomprised~f~Urinstructars,foutsupport~l, 
and two managem. The same can be said of the significant 
i n t e r a c t i a n ~ g e n d e r a n d f a c i l i t y ~ w i t h e i g h t  
l oca ted in theUni ted~andtwoatas ing leUK 






interviews was aducted to provide adslitionel bight 
intothefivethemesidmtXedmthequantMw 
t desige: acc;ombbilQ syskms, maqgrhl 
involvemen$ o q p h t b d  f- 
~ e n d r e p o r t i n g ~ . B e c r n u r e t b e  
imphmenMb of a safety system requires 
. . the full and uuamh.d 5 of leadership the 
respansesofthechiefexecutiveandthechiefflight 
~ a r e Q a m n i n e d m d e p t h m a d d i t i o n t o t h e ~  
aureanalysis. 
ChiefExemtive 
The chief executive was 53 years old and in his 
thhedyeurasheadofthetrainiagcr, ' " 
P r d o d y  he bad been h l v e d  m aviath as an airline 





involved with all aspects of aperatianal finauce 
and has been involved with the resolution of all major 
accidmb.Thechiefexecutiveis~thenoaninelheadof 
~ c o m p a n y ' s q u a l i t y ~  
48
Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, Vol. 22, No. 2 [2013], Art. 4
https://commons.erau.edu/jaaer/vol22/iss2/4
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/jaaer.2013.1397
Accountability system elements. 
Aschiefexeclltiveandprincipalownerofthe 
~ m t h e ~ s a s h i m s e l f a s ~  
acamtablefmalloftheactivitiesthatlakeplacemthe 
uqpbtim. While most chief executives would see 
~ o b l i g a t i ~ l l ~ a s t h c i r h i g h e s t p r i o l i t y t h e ~  
repoasthat*ishisovemhellningprimarycancern. 
ThispriarityisassigdnotonEybecrruseofmoxaI 
obligations to ensure a sa& flight emhment far staff ad 
studenSs but also out of ecanomic seIf-htem& Because 
lhemareinherratrislrsmaflighttrabg - " over 





Indeed, the chief d v e  is proud that he does 
not dntaiu a "am strike and you are out" policy with 
regardstoaccidenEsandincidents.Therearebdh~ 
and immctcm still aperating, sircraft who have been 




camnnmity. A " isdemedand by 
-=&the- , SO 
thatothcrs~learn~thehcidentaawel lashthe  
individual. Dhmhing the individual m question and 
pasaiagthemdownthelineto~ , ' " doesnot 




. . The d v e  and 
instructivevelueuftheseindiviaosrsis~lytoogreatto 
dismiss. 
Manage!rial involvement elements. 
To date, mampxnt has not been aa involved as 
hewouldhavelikedmpaomnotiqg~safetycuhurethathe 
dliketosee.Hepersollallytakcs~responaibilityfm 
t h i s , b e i i d i s h a c t e d b y ~ a s p e c $ o f t h e b u s ~  
o v e r t h e p a s t 1 2 ~ . A s c h i e f e x e c u t i v e t h e ~  
believes that he possesses dcient o p e d o d  knowledge 
t o b e i n v o l v e d i n t h e d a y ~ ~ o f f l i g h t ~  
ad tfaining but that the actual management and ddsiom 
arebestcarriedoutbyindividualshehas hiredto mihose 
leadeAhiproles.'Ibatsaid,hebelievesthatthe~ 
mtheir~~ar8do'mgallthatisnecessaaytoensure 
a safe operation. He believes that other changes may be 
necessary to achieve the level of safety desired by himseK 
the SW, and the investors. Management desires a zero 
-=fw==d 
Orgadmtionrl commitment elements. 




compliant safety - system. Very strlw3 
excepth was taken with the idea that m a q p m t  would 
p l a c c a u y a b j e c t i v e o v e r ~ , ~ g i v e n t h e  
~ ~ ~ b a r m b y t h e c h i e f e x e a r t i v e  
as the majority shareholder. When asked to discuss 
retrospctive rather than pmpective oqa&&od actions 
t h e c h i e f ~ d e c ~ t o e ~ c i t i n g t h e p e n d i n g  
Wgationofa~eccidesrtmthefallof2010. 
Instructor empowerment elements. 
No one m the entire -011 is more 
~ t o i m p e c t ~ t h e m t h e i n d i v i d u a l ~  
a c c o r d i n g t o t h e c h i e f c x e c u t i v e . A s ~ ~ o f  
thcirrespe&vetrainiagaircratt,pilotsmaybedozensto 
hmdmds of miles the school at any given time. 
E e c a u s e ~ i s l i t t i e t o n o o v e r a i g b t m ~ o f  
theilwmtomwhentheyare~training*they 
necessarilymustbeempoweredtotaketheacti~ll~ 
necessary to promote a safe flying culture. What 
~ m u s t d o , a n d n e e d s t o d o ~ ~ i s t o  
m a l r e s u r e t b a t t h e ~ h a v e t h e l i g h t ~ ~ a d  
bac&mds to implement the safety culture that is, 
 toth he chief executive, desiredbyallparties. The 
chief exedve  strongEy disagrees that there is m of 




Acmdingto the chiefexecutive there is a fully 
compliant Joint Aviation Authadh (JAA), U.K. Civil 
AviatimAuthority,adEAsAqualitysafetysystemthat 
i n c h d e s p r o v i s i a a s h s & t y ~ h a l l m e m b e m d  
t h e c a m m u n a y . ' I h i s i n c h r d w ~ S W , ~ a n d  
xmwgmmk This system is reviewed quarterly as part of 
the~quali tyauditsystem.Thechiefexecutive 
indicated~allcancernswere~leofbeingdmltwith 
rmonymoualy rnad p n @ y  m acamhcc with the 
proceduresoutlinedmthe~qualitymanual.When 
askedifthis involvedthe chiefexecutivemreviewingthese 
issue~~hesbtedthatnutmaUy,no,hedid~These 
~ a r e n o m d l y ~ b y t h e e p p a o l n i a t e l e v e l o f  
operational and expcted to be resolved there. 
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A s J ~ ~ S ~ C u l t n r e  
Chief Irligat Instructor 
Thechief~wes32yearsoldandhadbeen 
mtheposithhelewnmohs.Prioatoappnninpthe 
positionhehadbeenaninstmctorwiththe , ' " fix 
two yeam. His aviation badrgmund mklves an addit id 
sixyerasasanhdmtarand ISmoasbsasaregionalairline 
srstofficer.'Ihechiefinshnctorpositionishism 
manrrpement or h i e d i p  role. 
Aecountabllity system elements. 
Theacco~il itysystemispthnrvrihl~upan 
t h e ~ * s o w n s e I f - - S , t o t o M  
imtmdar. 'Ih mcady of flight hstmbm and their 




any type of accident or incident would be dflcient to 
e n c o l n a g e m o s t ~ t o o p e r a t e m t h e ~ m a r m e r  
mle. When asked if tbis reliance on self-brest 
programwasdciealtto~asllrethehighestlevelofsafety 
possible in-flight operations chiefbtmctm mpcmded that 
he believed it was, m fact, the most eftkctie method that he 
knew.WithautselSkwmmWMyhisetobea 
chimgembehavku. 
MaMger&l iwdvcment elemenls. 
ha a strong involvement m all 
aspectsofsafetypnmao4ion,accordingtothechief 
~ . B e c a u s e o f t h c h i g h ~ i n v o l v i a g b o t h  
stdentsmdstaffsuchanappma&isnecessary.New 
. .. . 
~ i n c l U d i D g t h e ~ 0 f t h e e r d s t i n g  
q u a s a y s y s t a a , l a e s e e n a s t h c ~ l e ~ o f d e a l i n g  
w i t h * ~ t h a t a r e ~ t o a r i s e w i t h t h e  
projectedincreasemniglrttrainingaverthenerrtsixd 
a n d t h e l l n d t i o n t o a n ~ o p e r a t i o n .  
~ w ~ e n t e l e m e n l s .  
The company has a very strong ummbent  to 
maintaining as& and effective £light aperatian. Because of 
the nature of the opedon it is very unlikely that 
phy!3io~needSsuchas!3leepor~shovlldcome 
intoplaymcausingandsituathfarmostinstrractom 
or their students during normal operations. Under no 
circumstances will management tohate msak activity. 
M d t i p l e i n d i v i d u e l s h a ~ b e e n ~ u p o n t h e ~  
o f f m s e w h e m ~ h a s h m e d o f d c a d u c t o f  
operations that violate either the letter or the spirit of 
regulations. 
Tlre M ~ i s n n w i l l i a g a n d t ' o r l m a b l e t o  
~ o n t h e s t a t e ~ f t h e ~ f l e e t , i t s ~ c e ,  
or the level oftechnology available to both stdents and 
~ w h e n o p e r e t i n g ~ a i r e r a f f . I n ~ c h i e f  
-50 
instructar's opinion, end k m  his own experience* there are 
n o ~ o r o t h e r w i s e ~ ~ i a s u e s r e ~ t h e  
airaa0's " rn - Orgeneral sefety. 
O u t - o f - - t h e b o x l y p e ~ ~ a s  related 





Instructor empowerment elements. 
. . 
Aswiththechiefexecub,thechiefhtmctor 
mamtemd a very strong belief h t  instnactars wexe 
e m p o w e r e d t o ~ a n d a c t ~ s a f e t y c o l l ~ .  
F e e d b d c ~ t h e ~ s t a f f i s s o l i c i t e d t h r o u g h  
W e e k l y W ~ a n d e n o p e P l d o a r p o l i c y i s  
. . . 
~ A s ~ a b o v e , s E a f f i s f u l l y e r r p e c t e d t o  
engage m this empowerment and implement d e t y  
h i t h t i ~ ~ ~ a s t h e y a r e a p p r o p r i a t e . T h e s e ~ ~ t 8 f o r  
&ions &auld be brought prat@y to managemeat's 
~ ~ ~ o n a n d ~ ~ t h e ~  
Reporting system elements. 
A c x c d h g t o t h e c h i e f ~ s a f a r m a l i z e d  
~ s y s t e m d o e s I K t i t ~ b e y o a d a s t a n d i n g ~ t o  
"seesonnething,say-relatedto*-. 
He stated that there was a collection box for r m ~ o u s  
safety~butthathediclnotknowwhereitwaslocated 
after the tramition to the new h a u p  that occurred 13 
m a n t b s p l i o r t o t h e ~ . M c r n a S s a f i G t y ~  
fimnsarempposedtobelocatedbehiudthedispatcher's 
desk mopedons butneitherthe chiefblmdornorthe 
~ o n d u t y w a s a b l e t o l o c a t e ~ ~ t h e  
~ t o l d t h e ~ t h a t s h e h a d n e v e r s e e n s u c h  
fiwms in her five m o d s  of employment 
CrnaSeAnrrlylhr 
A t o t a l o f s i x h W d u d ~ w e r e ~  
withrmmbarsofmrmApemGntandsta&Ind&tiontothe 
two pmiously detailed htemiews the chief ground 
hsmctor* the vice predent of business & v e a  the 
~ c h i e f ~ ~ * r m d t h e ~ ~ o f  
theexistingquelity-were' -9.degisa 
thefivethemesthatweredehedmtheqmuthtiveamlysis 
were pups&& explod to explain the results. Overall 
these me more ' " "' between the paaticipan$ limn 
thereweredifframces.F~decmedimportantheach 
individual tended to relate to their specific job position and 
~accordingto~ivedresponsibilityfarsafety.  
- tam--  
W ~ ~ o n , a l l o f ~ ~ ~ i t t h a t  
self-wand-%If-intwestwerethekey 
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is eqected that they will conduct themselves m a safe 
m. As noted m the table, there wexe di5emes of 
opinionastohow-providedstrnctured 
~ f a t h i s ~ V e d s y s t e m 0 f s e I f ~ .  . . 
Again,withoutexceptian,allofthesixmembersof 
m a m g e m e n t w h o w e r e ~ s a w p e m a m l  
~ i a n d ~ i a s t h e k e y t o s a f e t y . I t t w a s  
thought that the individuals themselves needed to canduct 
fhem,wlves in a sak manner rather than mawpmnt 
c r e a h g a u o v e r ~ a n d ~ s t r u c t u r e . ~ t h e  
C h i e f g r O d ~ d t h e d e j n l t y c h i G f g K n m d  
h&uctorwereoftheopinicmthatatthislevelthe 
- - b e f w ~ ~ f a s a f i e t y d  
t b e k e f n l l y ~ b .  
ImMgerm lnvohment dement#. 
W h e n ~ a b o u t t h e l e v e l o f ~  
involvement there was same varh th  between i&mhees. 
T h o s e w h o b e l i e v e d t b a t ~ c u u e n t l e v e l o f  
mvolwmentwascamctvarymverselywiththeir~ 
mthecopratehiem&y.TheThefirrtherindividualwas 
h m  the top, the mare he or she believed that ,mamgement 
ddOmomtopromotesafietydbeh1vedwilha 
-culture- 
Organizational commitment elementa 
Thesub-themesshownmthetableweredeveloped 
t b m u g h t h e m d  
" tehentsthatvaried 
ma&dlybehveemplaticipants.lherewasa~of 
opinions about the role that clareatly plays in 
their camhent  to safiety as well as a divergeme of 
opi&msmwhatmleisappm@ibk~toplay-  
Tae opinions expr#rsed by each individual intervicwee 
showed a similar divergeme m this cateory to the 
responses regard& mauaged involvement 
Instruetor empowermemt deneata 
'Ihuewaslittlcvariamxmrespaasesamcmgtbose 
interviewed. R e q m h t s  UDi- believed that the 
instructorswcre~iently,ifnotoverly,empoweredto 
imrolvethemdwsm~relatedactivitiea,submit 
s a f i e t y * l a t e d ~ d t o - t o p a e v e n t  
~actions.Twoindividualscitedthefactthatthe 
C l u r e n t c h i e f i n s t r u c t o r w a s ~ ~ t h e r a n L s o f  
~ ~ a s e v i d e n c e t l u l t t h e ~ ~ o f  
v a l u e s d s a k t y ~ i s t a k i n g p l a c e a n d w m k i n g  
well. 







0 f t h e ~ s ~ ~ S y s t e m . A l l o f t h e  
individuals believed that it was an impartant mqxment of 
both a quality and a safiety I-t system but none of 
t h r m r e c a l l e v e r ~ i n t h e r e p o r t i n g ~  
~ 1 v e s . O f t h e ~ ~ l n d n n d u a l s  . . .  
-=P- 
m depth previously, three of them believed that reparting 
safietycancernstotheirdirectsuperiorwasthemost 
e p p m p P i a b e d e f F e c t i v e ~ o f r e s o ~ O n l y t h e  
c h i e f g N n m d ~ , w h o h a s s e r v e d a s c h i e f ~  
~Eceronoccmionmthepast, felt itwouldbecrppropria6e 
t o a c t ~ o n s a m e ~ i s s u e s i f n e c e s s a r y .  
Discllseion 
ThequaliElrtiveanelysiscomburatedandfurtlm 
exphinedthe qmdtative adysis. The ofthe 
~ v e a n a l y s i s c Q n v e r g € ? d w i t h t h e ~ o f t h e  
. . 
~ a m e l y s i s a n d f i v e m a i n f a c t o R w e m a d y z d  
A n ~ ~ o f t h e ~ d t h e ~ v e  
resdtswasutilizedtoaddresstheresearchquestions. 
Reread Question One 
The &st raseaach question aimed to fhd the 
~ o f u n d e r l y i n g ~ o f s a f e t y r r t t i t u d e s m  
a flight training a p h t i o n  with operatid deficiencies 
that have redbd m several accidents. 
T h e m '  - t u ilized fm the 4 ''* " 
analysis, CASS, was d e s i i  to measure five 
mganhtional indicators of safiety culture. An interview 
caseanaly&3was~toerq , lOrethesef ive~omm~ 
ihueshthegurrqr '  ~'Ihefivehctomstudied 
were: Oqymhtioaal Cr " It to !hWy, Managerial 
Involvement in S-, Employee Empowerment, 
A ~ S y s t e m , a U d ~ S y s t e m . ~ i p a l  
c o m p o a e n t ~ ~ t h e e x i s t g l c e o f ~ m e i n  
factors.Aftermtat ion,Acamtabi i~m 11.3%of 
t h e v a r i e n c e , M ; 8 n a g e r i a l I m l ~ a c c 0 d f o r 6 . ~  
Organidonal Commitment accounted for 5.6% Pilot 
~ t l c a m b d k 5 . 4 % , d ~ ~  
aaxmted k 
5.3% 
the combkd varirmce for the five 
~was38.1%.Whilethesefactorsdidnotaccountfor 
even half of the varience, the qdhtive analysis appears to 
~ t h e ~ o f t h e ~ ~ . W i t h O u t  
exception all of the six members of who were 
interviewed saw personal mpamiiility and accouutability 
asfirrtherkeytosafiety. 
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Asscssin~t St#& Culture 
Research Question I k o  
Thesecondresearchquestion'sgoalwastofind 
h a w k e y i n d i v i d u a l s ~ t h e ~ o n d e s c r i b e d t h e  
~ e l e m e n t s . S i x ~ w e r e ~ w i t h  
members of management including the Chief Executive, the 
Chief Flight Instructar and the Chief Ground Wbwtor that 
alsoactsasthe~OpmtingOliicer,DeputyChief 
hstmtor, VP of Bnsiness Development aud Flight 
With regards to a c c o ~ ,  all of the ah 
n a e m b e r s o f m a n a p e m e n t ~ w e r e ~ w e d ~  
p e m o n a l m q x m M 3 y a n d ~ a s t h e k e y t o  
safety. There were Were of opinion as to how 
management provided stmctm and support for this 
p e r c e i v e d ~ o f s e I f ~ . I t w a ! 3 b e l i e v e d b y  
that the individuals themselves mded to 
c a n d u c t ~ l v e s m a s a k m a n n e r r r r t h e r t h a n t h e  
. . 




Those who &It that anent level of 
lmrolvementwasamectvarymvesselywithWposith 
intheaxpomtehiererrlry.Idndds . . withlowerpa5iti<~~ 
bel ievedthat~coulddomaretopmmote  safety 
audpmoteasafetyculture. 
TIE ophians about the role that 
d p l a y s m -  cammitmmttoaafetyvaried~ 
mqdentsaswellastheopiniaasofwhatroleis 
a-te fbr management to play. Individual 
~ ' s e r r p a e s s e d o p i n i a a s w a e s i m i l a r ~ ~  
casegoay as were their responses regsrding imtmbr 
empowerment. 
I n r e g a r d s t o ~ a m p o ~ a l l o f t h e  
~ b e l i e v e d r i u I t t h e ~ w e r e ~ i f  
n o t o v e r l y ~ t o l m r o l v e t b n s e l v e s m ~  
relatedactivities,submitsafetyrelatedsuggestians,andto 
htmvene to prevent ma& actions. Two individuals cited 
t h e ~ r i u I t t h e c u r r e n t c h i e f ~ m p n r m a t e d ~  
theranksoferristing~asevidencethattheupward 
f l o w o f ~ a n d s a f e t y ~ u 3 l i s t a k i n g p l a c e a n d  
WarLingwell. 
The regpanses regarding the repopting 
systemvaried,howevernoneofthe~accurably 
deta i ledthecurrentstabofthe~s~report ing  






Research Queation Three 
The third research question provided rmmmmmMons lbr 
the imphentation ofa Safety l h q e m m t  System based 
onthemsub. Omofthemain~oftbesbmdyisthet 
the~mlacksane~ve,strongstrongcultureand 
it is relying on the individuals' vahies and mostly fear of 
hmiugan~antheirrecordthatcouldruintheir 
career, and trust that the h d i d d s  will act m a saik 
manner. The first step to mating a Safety Management 
SystemistoatarCbycreatingsafietycultureinWhich 
everyom fmm mmagmmt to the line hsbudm to 
~ampartofaudmwhichtheybel ieve(Stolzer ,  
Halfwd, & Goglia, 2008). 
ImpUerrtiom and Remmmendations 
The sbngest finninn of this research study is that 
t h e ,  " asawholeishckiugashmgsystemof 
awmtabi i  by relying on individual iuterests. The 
peraption that pilots wil l  avoidhazards and cansequenSially 
not be imrohred m axidmb because it is m their best 
inhest can hardly be held as an exemplar or even an 
eEective model of safety culture. Same of the members of 
the- . . prekredhaving indi- act alone 
instead of inssituting a satkty culture tlm@mt the 
oqpbdoa. T h e m e m b e r s o f t h e ~ t e a m a l s o  
believed that the individuals themselves needed to conduct 
themselves in a saik manner rather than management 
crea lhganove~~&@andintrus ive~Al lo f the  
- agreed a safety - SYstm was 
impartant; however none of the mpodmls have 
@~inthecompany'sreprthgsystem,narare 
~ w i t h l t s e a m e n t s t a t P s o f ? h e ~ ~ I n a  
fd lersbucEy,~~sbovl ldbeinchdeds incethGy 
arean' talpart ofthe safietyofthe -on 
since they have to fly by themselves as a requirement of 
menyfligbtc0urses;maddition~erealsoalldtoreat 
theeircrattSamestudentscouldalsobeccrmeins(ructars 
and help maintain the safety culture of the w o n  if it
at all exists. In addith all of the accidents mvolved 
~ o n s o l o f l i g h t s a r r e n t a l ~ a n d a n ~  
w a s n o t o n M t h e ~ ~ t h e a a p u m p t i o a t h a t  
an individual-level program is sufEcient to ensure safety in 
~ ~ ( w s i s c Z e a r ~ n o t v a l i d a n d i m m e d i a t e ~ u 3 l  
is required. The imphmntalion of a safety culture and a 
S e f e t y ~ S y s t e m ~ ~ ~ -  
studies should include the addition of members of the 
studentbodytothepcess.Theprovensurveyinstnrment 
~ W ~ e t a L ( U ) 0 3 ) l l t i l i z e d m t h e s t d y a i d s m  
claims about construct validay. The rewi and 
~~oftheresul tscouldbeafbtedbythesample  
sh. Additionally, the lack of normality violates 
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awumptons ofparametric am@& and limits the sbtistical recommended far a d d i t i d  evaluations of so small a 
power of any M e r e d d  methods to be used as a + 
~ o f ~ b ~ t h e a p p ~ o f a s a f i e t y  
mlmapnnent system. A mixed methods appro& is 
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3 9 . C o n n p a n y m a n e p e m G n t s b o w s f i ~ t o ~ p i l o t s .  
43.Pilotswhocauseaccidentsar~arenot~~held~lefortbeiractim. 
46. Standards ofaccounfabilityare~appliedtoallpilotsinthiswmpauy. 
48. P i l o t s a r e ~ h e l d ~ l e f b r a c t i n g u m a & l y ,  eveniftheiractiaasdtimearmomy. 





81. Whenpilotsmake amistakeor do samethingwrong, they are dealtwithfairlybythe campany. 
1. involvement m satkty issues has a high priority at my company. 
5.Chiefpilotsdonothesitatetocontactpilotstodiscusssafetyissues. 
6. Flight~closelymonitmspmMencyandamency sEandsrdsto ensm pilots are quaMiedto flytheir 
asaigPea-. 
12.M;anegiement~uma&aperati<wsaractivities. 
19. My compauy's safety is d o ' i  a good job. 
26.Satktysbmdadsarese~discossedopenly. 
29. Upper level -gets pemody involved m safety activities. 
33. My compauy only keeps track of major safety problems and overlooks routhe ones. 
47. Managemens is receptive to learning about safety concerns. 
56. Mmgemmt has a clear " , ofrislrs asso&bd with fligM operations. 
59. o h  fails to recogpize when pilots are flying unsakly. 
66. Results ofFAA s&ty hspectim are made available to pilots for review and Mxmatioa. 
6 9 . ~ i a s u e s a r e a s s i g n e d h i g h ~ t y m ~ a t t h i s ~ .  
7 4 . ~ a r e k e p t ~ o f ~ c h a a g e s ~ a t F e c t ~ .  
79. Chief pilots are uaavailable when pilats need help. 
82.Themamgoodcomnnrmcahans . . hereaboutsafety. 
83. As long as there is no accident, doesn't care how the flight oped0118 are perfhmd. 
4. Followingdktypromhm iswmiskdyexpectd 
7. It is hard kr pilots here to mrrintain a casismsleep* .  
8 . W m g e m m t ~ ~ t 0 p u s b t b ~ .  
9. Management is cammatsd to equipping aircreft with up-todate tecblogy. 
10.~iswilliagtoinvestmoneyandef6nttoimprovesafety. 
ll.Wmgemmttriestogetaroundsafetynqhmer&whenevertheygetachauce. 
13. Wqpmt views FARs as a hindrance. 
14.Managemeart'sviewisthatnotallaccidentsare~le. 
15 .Mycampanydoeaa l l i t cautoprewntacc i~or~ .  
16.Mycmmpauydoeanotcutcanrerswheresafietyiscancerned. 
1 7 . M y ~ r ~ h ~ l y n s e s t b M B L a r ~ o f ~ e q u i p m n t ( e . ~ ~ , p s e w h e a i t ~ b e  
better to lix aimail). 
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18. Persolme1 mspomible for safety have autharity to implement changes. 
21. Perstmuel responsible for safiety hold a high strrtns in my company. 
22.Pilatswhoarenathlingwelloraretindareen#ruragsdnotto~. 
2 4 . S a f e t y i s ~ b y m y ~ d u r i n g t h e i n t e r v i e w ~ ~ O n p r o c e s s .  
25.Safietyworksdwearebuay. 
27.Samesafetyprocedure~esarenotreallypractid 
28. W h e a i t c a m e s d a w n t o i t , p e o p l e m ~ ~ w o v l d r e l h c r ~ a ~ ~ ~ t l l a n ~ a f 2 i g b t .  
30.Iam~~maintarrmcean~is~lyperfmmeddMairuaftaredtooperrrte. 
3 1. Training fiDcuses more on minimum rsquiffmenSs for a check ride than an safety. 
32. Management doesn't show much concern for sakty until there is an acdent or incident. 
37. C h e c l r l i s t s a n d ~ a r e ~ t o ~  
3 8 . S a f e t y i s i d d . f M a s a c a r e & m m y ~ .  
42. My compauy's m a d  are up to date. 
50. My~ismarecacemedwithmalringmoneythanbeihgs&. 
52. Trainingprdcesatmyamqmyare~msafety.  
55. Mmapnmit views regxllrrtion violaticms very seriously, even when they don't result m any serious d-ge. 
65.Safietyisahysdiscuaseddutingtrainingatmycampany. 
75. When an accident occurs, mmagmmt always blames the pilot. 




23. Pilots try to get mnmd safiety mpkmmb whenew they get a chance. 
35. Pilots are actively involved m idemdifying and resolving safety cancerns. 
40.Thebestpildsmhgroupexpect~pildstoMavedly. 
4 4 . ~ ~ t h a t d p i l a t s l l a e ~ l e a n d ~ l e f o r s & f l i g b t ~ m .  
4 9 . P i l d s a r e g i v e n ~ ~ t i e s t o m a k e s u g g e s t i a a s r e ~ s a f e t y i s s u e s .  
53.Pilotsdoalltheycantopreventaccidents. 
58.Pilatslookatthecoa3pany'ssafityrccordas~awnand~pridemit 
60. My coa3pany rarely questi~lls apilot's W a n  to tum a d  due to weather. 
62. Pilotswhoviolate safietyregulationsupsetotherpilots evenwhenno harmhas r e d t d  
6 8 . I a m ~ t o s t o p ~ - r e ~ a c t i v i t i e S M a r e ~ .  
7 6 . I t i s i m p o r t e n t t o ~ ~ i f I a m t o k # p t h e r e s p e c t o f o t h a ~ m m y ~ .  
8 0 . P i l a t s o f f e n ~ o n e r m o f f i e r t o ~ ~ l y .  
2 . I a m ~ w i t h h s y s t e m i % r ~ r e p o r t i n g ~ i a c 3 u e s w i t h m y c o n r p a n y .  
36.Pilotsarewilliagtoreport~ " " qardingsafbtyvioMoas,margiaalaviatorpe&mmm,andothermsafe 
behaviar. 
4 1 . S a f i e t y i s s u e s r a i s e d b y p i l o t s a r e ~ ~ l y t o d p i l o t s i n t h e ~ .  
4 5 . ' I h i s ~ ' s s a f b t y ~ i n c h d e s ~ ~ m e t o r e p o r t s a f e t y ~ ~  
51 .P i la t sdonos~~awnmis ta lreswhentheyare~0bvious .  
61. Pilots o h  cover up a hard landing ar a close call if they &el they can get away with it 
6 3 . I t i s b e s t t o r e m a i n ~ w h e n r e p o r t i n g a n ~ ~ a r i n C i d e n t .  
67. When a pilot qork i  a safety problem, ~nwmgemmt ects quickly to carrect safety issues. 
7 0 . P i l a t s w h o r a i s e s a k t y ~ a r e s e e n a s ~ ~  
72. Pilots can report sakty dhrepancies w h u t  the fear of negative repemmiom. 
73. Pilots who admit ernrrs make a big mistake. 
77. Thexe i s m p o i u t m ~ a m a r m i s s .  
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~ v e ~ e w ~  
Would you mind telling me about your backgraund, and how you came to work here? 
Wouldyoudescriiwhatyoudoandhowitrelatestothe~? 
I'd be htemted to hear what your most challenging dkty related event has been. 
What do you think are the biggest mispcrcepticms that employem have about saikty? 
What sa.&ty pmblem(s) need to be solved? 
Whatareallthe~leoptians?Whatarethepros/amsofeachaption? 
Whatpattermemerge h t h e c u r r e n t ~ e n ~ a n d w h e t a r e t h e @ v e d n e e d s f m ~ ?  
W h a t ~ a r e r e v e a l e d h ~ c a l s a f e t y r e c o r d s ?  
Wasthereanychangeinthe~vedneedsre~tothe~faSalaocidents? 
What managed issues arise~therapidtumverof stuknts andsEaffaudhow@ortanthavetbe 
i s s u e s b e C O m e t o t h e ~ ?  
Sincestudent~m~~andsEafftunroverareprojec6edto~whatecanonnic~will~bave 
on the planuing of the  an? 
Sincestudentcmo~andsEaff~areproj~to~whatimpactwillthathmnan~ 
safiety planning ofthe  an? 





H o w w i l l t h e ~ ~ t h e n e e d f w d k t y c h r v n g e s ~ t h e n e e d t o c ~ t h e ~ ~  
ofrrmtine*? 
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